Red Alert: On what accumulation path are we currently located?
Socio-economic transformation - progress or regression?
|
By Blade Nzimande, SACP General Secretary
We are now less
than a year-and-a-half away from completing the first decade of democracy
in South Africa. We are justifiably proud of the gains made in democratisation
and in the consolidation of political peace and stability. But what about
socio-economic transformation? Are we on the right track? Have we begun
to make an impact on the dismal apartheid legacy of racialised poverty
and inequality?
The answer is both yes and no. In some respects we are beginning
to make a significant impact, in other respects poverty and inequality
have worsened.
In mid-November the government agency, Statistics South
Africa, released a major report comparing household earnings and spending
for October 1995 and October 2000 ("Earnings and spending in
South Africa: Selected findings and comparisons from the income and expenditure
surveys of October 1995 and October 2000").
The Report finds that, in terms of income, the average South
African household became significantly poorer between 1995 and 2000. In
October 1995 the average household's income was R37,000. When inflation
is taken into account, the value for 2000 was projected to be R51,000
if average income were to remain constant. But the survey found the actual
average income for 2000, at R45,000, was well below that.
Deepening income inequality
These are average figures. When households are
divided into five bundles, each representing 20% (or "quintiles"),
ranging from the poorest to the richest 20%, then an even more sobering
picture emerges. In 1995 the poorest 20% of households received a mere
1,9% of the total income in our country. In 2000 this pitiful share had
dropped still further to 1,6% of total income. But the slipping back in
share is not only confined to the bottom 20% of households. The poorest
50% of South African households also slipped backwards in these five years
relative to the richer half.
Racialised inequality
Perhaps the most depressing statistic to emerge
from the mid-November Stats SA report is that the average African household
experienced a 19% fall in income, while the average white household experienced
a 15% increase!
In 1995 the average white household earned four times as
much as its average African counterpart. In 2000 the average white household
was now earning six times the average African household.
In its 1995 survey of household earnings and spending, the
Central Statistical Office (as Stats SA was then known) warned that income
was distributed "in a highly unequal manner", and that in this
respect SA was comparable to the other most unequal countries in the world,
like Brazil and Ecuador. It also noted the obvious, in SA this inequality
was not only racialised, but also gendered and geographical - households
headed by African women and rural households were the poorest. The 2000
survey shows that little has changed, the same basic patterns persist.
Income and expenditure are still distributed "in a highly unequal
manner", with race, gender and geography being strong determinants.
Deepening class exploitation
But when it comes to class, deepening inequality
is even more stark. According to the recently released statistics for
the second quarter of this year, operating profits (accruing basically
to a small minority of capitalists and the corporations they control)
exceeded the entire wage bill going to labour as a proportion of our GDP!
Ann Crotty, Business Report correspondent observes
bitterly:
"For those who had any doubts, the figures provide
unassailable proof that ANC policies have been much more supportive
of capital than labour
You have to go back 21 years to find another
period in which capital did as well. That was in 1981 when, for reasons
quite beyond the control of any South Africans, the gold price shot
up to $800 an ounce
The situation in 2002 is entirely different. It
represents the success of policies designed to achieve such a result.
The return on capital has been significantly enhanced while the return
to labour has been mercilessly squeezed. In real terms labour costs
in South Africa have fallen exceptionally fast in the last decade, which
is why our productivity has recorded the fifth biggest increase of the
46 largest economies in the world." ("Capital makes a mint
as labour takes the knock", Business Report, November
20, 2002).
Taken all together, we believe that these statistics
indicate that, despite our best intentions and expectations, our present
accumulation path remains stubbornly dominated by patterns of growth and
simultaneous under-development typical of a semi-peripheral capitalist
economy. We have not succeeded (nor is it easy to succeed) in breaking
out of the apartheid-era accumulation path.
The social wage
Does this mean that everything is getting worse?
That all government socio-economic policies are failing to redress the
apartheid legacy? The answer is no.
The Stats SA report comparing households for 1995 and 2000
shows very significant progress in the impact of "social" wage
measures - things people get for free or at subsidised rates, such as
basic services, health care and schooling.
The proportion of people with access to clean water climbed
from 79% to 83%. Those with access to electricity for lighting rose from
64% to 72%. Those with access to telephones rose from 29% to 35%. People
living in formal housing rose from 66% to 73%.
So why are we succeeding on some fronts, and failing on
others?
The lessons are very clear - "the political economy
of labour versus the political economy of property"
Back in 1864, Marx warmly celebrated what were,
on the face of it, relatively modest reforms of the dominant capitalist
system in Britain at the time - the passing of the Ten Hours Bill, and
the building of a workers co-operative movement. These measures had their
own inherent, short-term value, but they also imposed, Marx argued, a
different, an anti-systemic, a potentially transformational logic onto
the dominant accumulation path. He writes of the passage of the Ten Hours
Bill:
"besides its practical import, there was something
else to exalt the marvellous success of this working men's measure
it
was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the
middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class."
In similar terms, Marx celebrates the building
of a workers cooperative movement as a
"still greater victory of the political economy of
labour over the political economy of property."
Here in South Africa the statistics are telling
us that where we are simply going with the flow of capitalism ("the
political economy of property"), seeking to create an investor friendly
climate, we are singularly failing to address the apartheid socio-economic
legacy - the emergent bourgeoisie emerges, the established rich get richer,
the great majority suffer worsening income poverty and inequality.
On the other hand, where we have tried, even if unevenly,
to defend and consolidate the public sector (education and health); where
we have, at least until recently, held on to key parastatals and provided
them with a relatively clear developmental mandate (electricity and telecommunications);
where we have rolled back, to some extent, the capitalist "user-
pays" market principle (water and electricity); where we have strategically
intervened into the capitalist market with active subsidy policies (housing)
- in these cases we have had a tangible transformational impact on the
apartheid socio-economic legacy.
Marx put it very well back in 1847:
"The theoreticians of the proletarian class
no longer
need to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of
what is happening before their eyes and become its mouthpiece."
Where we have muddled along between these two different
strategic approaches, between the "political economy of property"
and the "political economy of labour", as in transport, neither
privatising whole-sale, nor putting in serious infrastructural or subsidy
investments, there has been a slow deterioration. We are going backwards,
forwards and side-ways simultaneously.
There are also other important areas where there are arguably
positive lessons to be learnt. For instance, without necessarily imposing
an alternative "political economy" logic, where we have provided
active, industrial sector policies and fostered a collective social-accord
buy-in (notably in the auto- and auto-components sector) then actual export-led
growth and some job retention and skill training and development has occurred.
Perhaps things have improved since October 2000?
We have been relying essentially on statistics
that take us up to October 2000. Some comrades may argue that since then
there has been a turn-around, or that deepening poverty, unemployment
and inequality have bottomed-out, and that in the relative short-term
we should see a significant take-off. We have, of course, been promised
an imminent take-off ever since mid-1996. However, we should not just
rule out these alternative views.
In the second quarter of 2002 there were indications that
job losses had, indeed, bottomed-out (at a very high level of unemployment,
approaching 40%). However, the Department of Trade and Industry economists
who noted this development were not predicting a sustained bottoming-out,
unfortunately. With an annual GDP growth for this year at around 3%, South
Africa is one of the better performing economies globally. This is certainly
something to acknowledge, and it is, no doubt related, in part, to the
"stabilisation" of key macro factors, and the partial "insulation"
they have given us. However our relatively better performance is more
a reflection of a major global down-turn, than an indication that we are
performing radically better than in previous years. Growth, of course,
is no guarantee of lessening poverty or inequality, and by common accord
the current 2-3% levels are in any case entirely inadequate to make a
significant dent in our developmental and unemployment deficits.
The gains themselves are threatened
Even more pertinent and concerning is the fact
that in a mixed economy dominated by capitalism (the "political economy
of property"), the gains made through imposing an alternative logic
(the "political economy of labour") are never secure and are
always threatened by roll-back. We have, in fact, to boldly press ahead
with an accumulation of transformational measures, or the advances will
themselves be engulfed and turned around.
We have made head-way with overcoming resource poverty and
inequality, while losing ground on the front of income poverty and inequality.
However, income and resources are interconnected, especially when services
are increasingly commercialised or privatised. Gains made with overcoming
resource poverty can be undermined by income poverty. There is strong
evidence to suggest that this is the case with telecommunications, for
instance.
Guided by its public sector developmental mandate, and assisted
by its temporary fixed line monopoly, Telkom has rolled out an impressive
2,67 million new lines, many to poor communities. However, addressing
the telecommunications resource back-log has been conceptualised largely
as an interim measure - the roll-out of infrastructure. The sustainability
of this developmental measure has clearly not been adequately strategised.
Sadly, as Telkom's own 2001-2 financial statement was forced to concede,
only 667,039 of the 2,67 million lines delivered were still in service.
Over two million lines delivered have been cut-off because the poor communities
to which they had been delivered could not pay for the service. This was
related to general income poverty, but also to the contradictory restructuring
trajectory of Telkom. Getting ready for its own further privatisation
and for competition on the fixed-line market, Telkom has brought down
the cost of international calls, in the niche market where it is likely
to face most competition. However, in the mass domestic market, where
there will be little competition, Telkom has hiked up call prices far
in excess of inflation. The privatisation and liberalisation objectives
of making Telkom more sellable and more competitive, and the developmental
objective of sustainable services to the millions of poor in our country
have simply collided head-on. The privatisation/liberalisation agenda
has won against the developmental agenda.
It will be informative to see what the October 2002 household
statistics tell us about telephones. It is probable that some of the cut-offs
noted above will be partially compensated by increased cell-phone usage.
It is unlikely, however, that more costly cell-phones will completely
make up for the 2 million cut fixed lines. Either way, it is clear that
the sustainability of a progressive measure, the mass roll-out of telephone
fixed line infrastructure, was not adequately thought through, and was
not adequately aligned with other policy measures. At the very least,
significant public resources have been ploughed into 2 million unsustainable
phone line connections.
We suggest that on many other fronts - housing, education,
health-care - progressive advances are constantly threatened by income
poverty, by policy incoherence, and by the absorption of resources (including
human resources) into parallel (and even sometimes foreign) private sectors.
We have no choice - we have to push boldly ahead
with ongoing transformational measures that address both resource and
income poverty and inequality. There is no short-cut within the National
Democratic Revolution, no short-term roll-outs, no simple "market
correction", no quick corrective measures that will "normalise"
and "de-racialise" our reality.
Unless we deal with class realities within our NDR we will
not be able to resolve the national question itself. It is our considered
view that both the new phase of imperialism, and the stark challenges
posed by the statistical indicators of persisting inequality and poverty,
underline the salience of the general strategic positioning the SACP has
adopted over the last decade. In supporting the NDR, in identifying the
NDR as the dominant task of our present reality, we have also insisted
on the validity (and necessity) of independent socialist theory AND independent
class-based socialist organisation and mobilisation. Without a systematic
socialist approach as a significant current within the NDR, we are doomed
to reproducing our marginal, semi-peripheral global status, and to reproducing
extreme race and class poverty and inequality.
It is for all the above reasons that the SACP welcomes the
commitment by government to hold the Growth and Development Summit during
the first half of 2003.
The SACP cannot over-emphasise the centrality of a growth
and development strategy in addressing the massive challenges we face.
It is important that as we approach the Growth and Development Summit
the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance reaches extensive consensus and agreement.
This will ensure that we approach and engage with and against private
capital as a united people's voice.
Where there are trade-offs, they should be not be premised
on the current accumulation path, where only the working class is expected
to make sacrifices. This should include the review of the very so-called
"fundamentals" so that we do not approach this crucial Summit
from narrow trenches.
The Growth and Development Summit must
not suffer the same fate suffered by the 1998 Presidential Jobs Summit.
Concrete and binding agreements and commitments from all sides - labour,
community, government and capital - must be reached with clear goals,
targets, and workable implementation and monitoring mechanisms.
|